The U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, Robert Gallucci, warned that it could collapse if the United States did not meet the commitments it had accepted. [32] The terms of the pact and the resulting agreements include the closure of the Yongbyon pilot reactor, the abandonment of the construction of two large nuclear power plants, and the sealing of spent fuel that could have been synthesized under IAEA supervision to produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon. In return, by 2003, two light water reactors would be built in North Korea at a cost of $4 billion, mainly supplied by South Korea. [15] Meanwhile, North Korea would be powered by 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to compensate for lost energy production. North Korea had to fully comply with its IAEA safeguard agreement, which allowed the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness of its initial statement before the reactor`s main nuclear components were provided. Once the LWR facilities are completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and related facilities. North Korea and the United States have been increasingly divided over the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States has done little to meet its commitment to normalizing political and economic relations. [34] When economic sanctions were not lifted until 1999 and no full diplomatic relationship was initiated between the United States and North Korea, North Korea warned that if the United States had not maintained its end, it would resume the nuclear research. [Citation required] There were also a few confidential minutes that supported the agreement and were not made public. [8] [9] These must include the full IAEA safeguards when the main non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit have been completed, but before the delivery of important nuclear components.

[10] Shortly after the signing of the agreement, control of the U.S. Congress changed for the Republican Party, which did not support the agreement. [19] [20] Some Republican senators were strongly opposed to the agreement and found it appeased. [21] [22] Originally, emergency funds from the U.S. Department of Defense that were not under congressional control were used to finance transitional oil deliveries under the agreement[23] with international funding. Starting in 1996, Congress allocated appropriations, but not always sufficient amounts. [14] [24] As a result, some transitional oil deliveries were delivered late. [25] KEDO`s first director, Stephen Bosworth, later commented, « The agreed framework was a political orphan within two weeks of signing. » [26] On 21 October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement calling on Pyongyang to freeze the operation and construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a nuclear weapons program disguised in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors.